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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DARLENE COLLINS, as guardian
of VICKIE L. COLLINS, an
incompetent person,

:
:

Plaintiff and Appellant, :
v.

:

UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
and the STATE OF UTAH,

:

Case No. 981511-CA

Priority No. 15

:

Defendants and Apellees.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Darlene Collins, the natural mother of Vickie Collins, a
multi-disabled, adult resident of defendant Utah State
Developmental Center (USDC), brings this appeal from an order of
the Third Judicial District Court directing a verdict in favor of
the state defendants on her medical malpractice claim.
Jurisdiction over the claim lies within this Court under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) pursuant to a transfer from the
Supreme Court of Utah (R. 215).

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly rule that expert testimony

was required to establish the standard of care governing the
control of Vickie Collins1 recreational activities by USDC?
The necessity for expert testimony in the case was
explicitly raised in the memorandum supporting defendants1 motion

in limine, which sought to exclude plaintiff's proposed expert as
unqualified to testify on the standard of care applicable to each
of the health care providers involved in the challenged decision.
See R. 68-72 and 135-39. The trial judge ruled in favor of
defendants on the issue orally from the bench during trial (Tr.
293-95) and by subsequent written order granting defendants'
motion for directed verdict (R. 166-171).
Standard of Review:

The facts underlying plaintiff's claim

in this case are not disputed, and judgment was given for
defendants on the legal ground that plaintiff's failure to
present expert testimony on the applicable standard of care and
the breach of that standard left two critical elements of the
case unestablished (R. 169). Under supreme court precedent, "a
directed verdict is appropriate if, on uncontested facts and
under the applicable law, one party is entitled to judgment."
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991).

Such

"[l]egal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and afforded no
deference."

Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918,

920 (Utah 1997); see also Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 787
P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1990) ("A trial court's conclusions of law
are reviewed for correctness and are not given special
deference").
2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in finding

plaintiff's expert witness unqualified to testify as to the
standard of care owed by USDC to Vickie Collins?

2

Defendants placed the testimonial competence of plaintiff's
expert at issue in the memorandum accompanying their motion in
limine.

See R. 68-72, 135-39. The district court judge ruled

for defendants on this issue orally from the bench during trial
(Tr. 293-95) and by subsequent written order (R. 168-69).
Standard of Review;

"It is within the discretion of the

trial court to determine whether a particular witness qualifies
as an expert and to rule on the admissibility of the expert!s
testimony."

Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904, 906

((Utah App. 1997).

The appellate court therefore reviews the

district court's determination for abuse of that discretion.

Id.

at 907.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court for decision
is contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Darlene Collins brought this action in February, 1996

(R. 2), on behalf of her daughter Vickie Collins. Vickie is an
adult woman with profound mental retardation who also suffers
from schizophrenia (Aplt. App. 7) and has a history of seizures
(Aplt. App. 9). Plaintiff alleged that defendants negligently
allowed Vickie to use a standard swing for recreation despite
3

Vickie's known history of seizures which had caused unrelated
injury in the past, and that, in consequence, Vickie fell from
the swing and sustained an injury resulting in permanent
paraplegia (R. 2-5). At the time of the accident, Vickie did not
have a legal guardian (Aplt. App. 7). Defendants answered,
denying liability (R. 14-21), and the case proceeded toward
trial.

In May of 1998, defendants filed a motion in limine

(R. 64-66), with a supporting memorandum (R. 67-75), seeking to
exclude the testimony of plaintiff's designated expert witness,
Lewis Mustard, as to the standard of care owed to Vickie by her
health care providers at USDC.

Plaintiff filed a cross-motion

(R. 79-80) and memorandum (R. 81-112) which, among other things,
opposed exclusion of Mustard as unqualified to testify
(R. 82-84).
During a recess early in the trial, the district court
judge, outside the hearing of the jury, preliminarily sustained
defendants' objections to Mustard's qualifications (Tr. 21), but
agreed to give plaintiff an opportunity to establish additional
qualifying foundation later in the day (Tr. 22-24).

Plaintiff's

attempt was unsuccessful, and Mustard's testimony was precluded
(Tr. 274-95).

At the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the

court reconvened while the jury was in recess, and defendants
moved for a directed verdict, which was orally granted from the
bench (Tr. 330-37) and later reduced to writing (R. 166-71).
This appeal followed (R. 193-94).

4

B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
When the events forming the basis of this lawsuit took

place, Vickie Collins was a 40-year-old resident of the Utah
State Developmental Center, to which she had first been admitted
in 1958 (Aplt. App. at 7). Withdrawn from USDC a year later, she
returned full-time in 1966 and has resided there continuously
since her return under a dual diagnosis of severe mental
retardation and schizophrenia (id.).

She also has a history of

sporadic seizure activity (id. at 17).
Swinging has been one of Vickiefs favorite activities since
she became a full-time USDC resident, according to plaintiff (Tr.
143), something she would do every chance she could get from the
time she was a little girl (Tr. 144). In fact, plaintiff stated
on direct examination by her counsel that at times, she had taken
Vickie out to swing on the swings located outside the Raintree
building where Vickie was housed1--the very swings on which she
was ultimately injured--and acknowledged that Vickie had enjoyed
engaging in swinging for years (Tr. 101-02).

Vickie had used the

swings for some 28 years without incident before the accident
that forms the basis of this case.
x

0n cross-examination, plaintiff denied ever having used the
USDC swings:
Q: And when you would visit [Vickie] before the
accident at the Center, you would sometimes take her
out to the swings at the Center to swing?
A: No.
Q: You never used the swings at the Center?
A: No.
Tr. 144. Plaintiff, did, however, acknowledge taking Vickie to
the local park, where she would play on the regular playground
swings like those she used at the Center (see Tr. 144-45).
5

Plaintiff was well aware of Vickie's seizures, beginning
with the petit mal seizures Vickie had as a child (Tr. 90) and
progressing to seizures of greater intensity at puberty (Tr, 91).
Plaintiff personally witnessed some of these seizures (Tr.
91-92).

She testified that USDC staff would tell her about

Vickie's seizure activity when she would visit Vickie at the
Center (Tr. 90) and noted that Vickie's swinging had been
restricted due to seizures at one time during the late 1960s (Tr.
136).

She did not recall any other occasions when Vickie's

seizures led to a restriction on swinging (Tr. 97). She also
noted that at one time a number of years before the accident,
Vickie had been placed in a helmet (Tr. 93) for her own
protection (Tr. 99); in fact, plaintiff herself had provided the
helmet (Tr. 97-98) .
Near the time of the accident, Vickie had once again been
placed in a protective helmet after sustaining head injuries when
she fell during a seizure on December 9, 1993, and hit her head
on a filing cabinet (Aplt. Brf. at 15, % 20).

According to her

testimony, plaintiff had no objection to the use of the helmet
even though the decision to use it was not discussed with her in
advance (Tr. 98-99).

Plaintiff further testified that she had no

concerns about Vickie's safety at the Center in light of Vickie's
seizures.

As she stated,

[Vickie] had lived there for a long time. They had a
helmet on her before for her own protection and I knew
that I was her mother and that I had turned my
motherhoodship over to the school and that I felt that
they would be responsible for her safety.
6

(Tr. 99). She also admitted that Vickie had previously been
injured at the Center in a seizure-related fall in which she lost
some of her teeth, but did not hold USDC responsible because
prevention would have required Vickie to be strapped into a chair
in violation of her rights (Tr. 146-47).
Decisions about Vickie's care and activities were made by an
interdisciplinary team of professionals, including a qualified
mental retardation professional (QMRP), a social worker, a nurse,
a recreational therapist, and direct care staff (Tr. 290-91).
Each year, the treatment team conducted a staffing and completed
a comprehensive individual habilitation plan (IHP) reviewing all
facets of Vickie's institutional care and establishing treatment
objectives and methodologies for the coming year (Aplt. App.
7-20; Tr. 130-34).

Plaintiff acknowledged that when she was

present at the annual staffing of Vickie's case most closely
preceding the accident, she did not ask the staff to prevent
Vickie from swinging, even though she was aware of Vickie's
increased seizure activity during the prior few months (Tr. 135),
nor did she raise the issue with Vickie's neurologist (Tr.
135-36).
On March 9, 1994, Vickie and seven other residents of the
Raintree building were taken outside to play under the
supervision of two staff members. Vickie, wearing her helmet,
immediately went to the swings and began swinging (Aplt. Brf. at
18, %% 32-33; Tr. 246-47).

A staff member testified that she was

within 10 to 15 feet of Vickie, with Vickie in her peripheral
7

vision, while kicking a ball to another resident (Tr. 253-54) .
Within three or four minutes, the staff member heard a thump and
saw Vickie lying on the ground (Tr. 24 8).

As a result of the

fall, Vickie sustained a high-impact burst of the T-7 vertebra
which resulted in her paralysis (Tr. 165-66).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff claims that her case sounds in simple negligence,
not medical malpractice, and that consequently, she is not
required to present expert testimony to establish the standard of
care owed to Vickie Collins by defendant health care provider
Utah State Developmental Center.

In the alternative, plaintiff

claims that even if the case is deemed a medical malpractice
action, she is exempt from the requirement to present expert
testimony on the standard of care because the cause of Vickie1s
injury is within the common knowledge and experience of the lay
juror.

She also argues that because she has sued only the

facility, not individual staff members, no professional standards
of care are relevant.

In effect, having invoked the Utah Health

Care Malpractice Act as the basis for her complaint, plaintiff
now seeks to disavow its strictures and change the legal theory
of her case on appeal to "facility negligence" (see Aplt. Brf. at
24, n.l), a term unknown in published Utah case law, in direct
contradiction to her position below.

Neither the content of her

pleadings nor the uncontested record facts support such a change.
As plaintiff failed to bring herself within the exceptions to the
8

necessity for expert testimony on the applicable standard of care
in her medical malpractice action, the district court correctly
concluded that she had likewise failed to establish the elements
of her claim, warranting a directed verdict for defendants.
Because the district court did not misapply the law in
requiring expert testimony, it was within the court's discretion
to determine whether plaintiff's proposed expert witness was
qualified to testify as to the relevant standard of care. As the
record reflects, the court carefully considered the nature of the
proposed expert's credentials and experience.

Plaintiff does not

contest the court's factual findings, which provide a rational
basis for its decision to exclude the testimony.

Since the

court's determination does not exceed the limits of
reasonability, it is entitled to affirmance on appeal.

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF CANNOT AVOID THE NECESSITY TO PROVIDE
EXPERT TESTIMONY BY CHANGING THE LEGAL THEORY OF HER
CASE ON APPEAL.
From the inception of her action against defendants,
plaintiff has relied on a medical malpractice theory under the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1
through -16 (1996), as the basis for her claim.

Her complaint

states that she served notice of intent to commence action under
section 78-14-8 (1996), which prohibits action against a health
care provider absent notice under the act (R. 3, % 7). The
complaint further asserts that the Division of Occupational and
9

Professional Licensing certified plaintiff's compliance with all
the requirements of section 78-14-12 (1996), which establishes
the procedural requisites of a prelitigation hearing under the
act (R. 3, % 8). At no time in the case below did plaintiff
repudiate her reliance on the act.
Plaintiff wrongly asserts that any tort committed by a
health care provider is deemed a medical malpractice action under
the act. Her truncated citation to the act's definition of a
medical malpractice action (see Aplt. Brf. at 26, n.3) neglects
to include the statutory language that links the alleged tort to
the provision of health care.

Under the definitions contained in

section 78-14-3,
"Malpractice action against a health care provider"
means any action against a health care provider,
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health care
rendered or which should have been rendered by the
health care provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 1998)2 (emphasis added).
Subsection (11), in turn, states that
"Health care provider" includes any person,
partnership, association, corporation, or other
facility or institution who causes to be rendered or
who renders health care or professional services as a
hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental
hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory
technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric
physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician,
naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician,
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speechlanguage pathologist, clinical social worker, certified
2

The 1998 amendment to section 78-14-3 did not affect the
language of subsection (14).
10

social worker, social service worker, marriage and
family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others
rendering similar care and services relating to or
arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any of
the above acting in the course and scope of their
employment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1998)3 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff has never contended that the Utah State Developmental
Center is not a health care provider under the actfs expansive
definition or that it did not render or cause to be rendered
professional services relating to or arising out of Vickie's
health needs and provided by its employees or agents. Nothing in
plaintiff's brief on appeal addresses the applicability of these
statutory definitions that bring her cause of action within the
scope of the act's coverage.
The uncontested facts do, however, amply demonstrate the
act's applicability.

As plaintiff herself points out, USDC "had

a limited guardianship over [Vickie] Collins for the purpose of
providing her with medical treatment" (Aplt. Brf. at 13, % 9) and
"provided Collins with comprehensive care for her individual
needs" (id. at 13, % 8) through the use of Individualized
Habilitation Plans (IHPs) which "took into account each
resident's individualized needs, abilities, and limitations" (id.
at'13, 1 11) in determining "specific treatment objectives and
plans for residents1 medical, recreational, social, dietary, and
other needs" (id.).

In other words, Vickie's comprehensive,

3

The 1998 amendment to section 78-14-3 did not affect the
language of subsection (11).
11

multiple disabilities required equally comprehensive treatment
that extended to all areas of her life and was provided by Center
personnel--employees or agents of USDC acting in the course and
scope of their employment.

Because plaintiff claims that this

comprehensive care was negligently rendered, her action sounds in
health care malpractice, as the district court correctly
determined:

"While this is not a classic medical malpractice

action as such, it does, it clearly involves the providing of
health care services which is [sic] specialized in nature and
beyond the realm of common lay knowledge" (Tr. 337).

In light of

the record facts, plaintiff's contention that her claim is for
simple negligence, not professional malpractice, is untenable.
It is firmly established in Utah law that proof of medical
malpractice requires expert testimony as to the standard of care
and its breach.

As this Court has stated,

In medical malpractice actions the plaintiff must
provide expert testimony to establish: 1) the standard
of care; 2) defendant's failure to comply with that
standard; and 3) that defendant caused plaintiff's
injuries. Further, issues of fact which are outside
the knowledge and experience of lay persons must be
established by expert testimony.
Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah
App. 1987); see also Burton v. Youncrblood. 711 P.2d 245, 247-48
(Utah 1985); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980);
Kent v. Pioneer Vallev Hosp.. 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1997);
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah App. 1994); Chadwick v.
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 1988); Martin v. Mott. 744
P.2d 337, 338 (Utah App. 1987).

Plaintiff cites to Nixdorf for
12

the proposition that under certain circumstances, expert
testimony is unnecessary.

In Nixdorf, a physician left a needle

in the plaintiff!s abdomen during surgery.

The trial court

directed a verdict for defendants on the basis that plaintiff had
failed to introduce expert testimony on the applicable standard
of care.

The supreme court reversed, applying a res ipsa

loquitur theory as an exception to the general rule.

Plaintiff

seeks the same result here.
However, the Nixdorf exception cannot be stretched so far.
This Court explained Nixdorf's limited reach in Chadwick as
follows:
The Nixdorf exception can be fully understood only in
light of its facts. The doctor in Nixdorf lost a
cutting needle inside his patient's body and then
failed to disclose this fact. The Utah Supreme Court
held that jurors could determine the standard of care
the doctor was required to follow without expert
medical testimony because it is common knowledge that
reasonable medical practitioners do not leave surgical
instruments inside their patients' bodies and then keep
it a secret. The Court noted that expert testimony
would shed little light on the "propriety of the
treatment" the Nixdorf plaintiff received. 612 P.2d at
352-53.
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 821-22.

The facts in Nixdorf fulfill the

purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine as explained by the
supreme court:
to permit one who suffers injury from something under
the control of another, which ordinarily would not
cause the injury except for the other's negligence, to
present his grievance to a court or jury on the basis
of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such
facts, even though he may be unable to present direct
evidence of the other's negligence.

13

Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 348 P.2d 935, 936
(Utah 1960). In Joseph, the court held the doctrine inapplicable
to an incompatible blood transfusion reaction, noting that "there
can be no certainty that there will be no adverse blood reaction
even when the best methods known to medical science are used in
the typing and matching of the blood."

Joseph, 348 P.2d at 938.

Because certainty of causation may be lacking, the court applies
the doctrine "only with caution, particularly in the medical
field because of the realization that many aspects of the
treatment of human ills cannot yet be regarded as exact science
and a bad result may obtain even though recognized standards of
care and skill are employed."

Id.

The court rejected

plaintiff's appeal for this reason.
As in Joseph, the facts in plaintiff's case do not warrant
the application of a res ipsa loquitur theory--the basis of the
Nixdorf exception--to overcome the need for expert testimony.
The swing on which Vickie was injured was not in defendants1
exclusive control. A fall from a swing and resulting injury
could have occurred by accident and without defendants1
negligence.

Given the complexity of factors--severe mental

retardation, schizophrenia, and a controlled seizure
disorder--that faced the interdisciplinary health care team in
making recommendations for Vickie's activities, its choices are
beyond the knowledge and experience of lay jurors, and could be
adequately explained only through the testimony of one or more
experts familiar with the standards of care to be met by the team
14

members.

The district court's decision to require expert

testimony was fully compliant with legal precedent, and plaintiff
has given no reason to disturb it.
plaintiff attempts to excuse her neglect to provide expert
testimony by blaming the trial court for

ff

fail[ing] to identify

which particular health care service(s) were at issue" (Aplt.
Brf. at 29).

Plaintiff misapprehends her burden to go forward.

The court need not produce a blueprint for her legal education;
it is her initiative to proceed by establishing the elements of
her case in accordance with statute and precedent, and her burden
on appeal to show the lower court's decision to be flawed.

Doing

neither, her cause must fail.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO
REJECT PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED EXPERT AS UNQUALIFIED TO
TESTIFY ON THE STANDARD OF CARE DEFENDANTS OWED TO
VICKIE.
Because the trial court did not misapply the law in
requiring expert testimony, it had discretion to determine
whether plaintiff's proposed expert was qualified to testify as
to the standard of care defendants owed to Vickie; fl[i3t is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a
particular witness qualifies as an expert and to rule on the
admissibility of the expertfs testimony."

Kent, 930 P*2d at 906.

Plaintiff's argument that her expert was qualified to testify
depends on her characterization of the case as one asserting
negligence by a facility rather than malpractice by a health care
provider.

See

Aplt. Brf. at 44 n.13.

She asserts that

defendants1 actions "put at issue the Center's risk management
15

principles that were in place to protect its residents" (Aplt.
Brf. at 44).
As the trial court found, Lewis Mustard is "certainly an
eminently [qualified] man in his own area of expertise,
specifically the hospital management.

But I am not persuaded

that he presents the appropriate credentials for opining
regarding the negligence or lack thereof of the facility in
question here incident to what is being tried" (Tr. 293-94).

The

court explained:
He has, by his candor and his testimony, and his
curriculum vitae, acknowledge[d] that he has no formal
schooling in patient care, that his management health
care facilities experience has been by and large in
institutions, dealing with institutions that did not
have as their additional burden dealing with those
people who are severely handicapped or developmentally
disabled or mentally retarded. He has not rendered
treatment to mentally disabled people, he has not been
on the front line of making decisions regarding safety
of those individuals, in particular, as it relates to
recreation. He has testified that he is not familiar
with the standard of care at an ICFMR [Intermediate
Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded], which is what
we are dealing with here, in particular with patients
who have signs of seizure in their use of swing sets,
and for that matter, other recreational facilities.
He is not, by his candid testimony, a qualified
mental retardation professional. He is not a licensed
professional in any field. He has no recollection of
when he last visited or observed activities in an
ICFMR. He has reviewed no other facilities [sic]
policies incident to the issue we're faced with here
today, he has so testified. And he is not familiar
with policies outside of what we're concerned with in
this particular case, that is, policies of other
facilities.
Tr. 294-95.

Finding a significant distinction between Mustard's

risk management experience and the provision of direct health

16

care services, the court sustained defendants1 objection to
Mustard's testimony (Tr. 295).
Rather than showing error in the district court's findings,
plaintiff simply recycles the arguments she made below.

She does

not deny that Mustard lacked direct patient care experience or
certification in any of the specialties represented on Vickie's
IHP team.

While she insists that "Dr. Mustard's broad experience

and numerous credentials qualified him to testify as an expert"
(Aplt. Brf. at 45), she neglects to acknowledge that any expert
is limited to testifying in the area of his expertise.

The

question she fails to answer is how Mustard's particular
experience and credentials demonstrate a standard of care that is
shared with that of Vickie's caregivers, the individuals whose
actions are at issue in this case.
Burton v. Youngblood is instructive on this point.
Youngblood, a general plastic surgeon, performed an upper eyelid
blepharoplasty on Burton which resulted in ptosis, or eyelid
droop.

After Youngblood was unable to correct the problem,

Burton sought the assistance of other plastic surgeons and an
opthalmologist, Dr. Jackson; she also filed suit against
Youngblood, using Jackson to testify to the requisite standard of
care.

The case was dismissed at the close of Burton's case-in-

chief on the ground that she had failed to establish the standard
of care or its violation by Youngblood.

On appeal, Burton argued

that Jackson was qualified to testify as to the standard of care
because both Jackson and Youngblood performed the same surgical
17

procedure, even though their respective specialties were
different.

The court disagreed, implementing the general rule

that "ordinarily, a practitioner of one school of medicine is not
competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against
a practitioner of another school."

Burton. 711 P.2d at 248. It

acknowledged an exception to the rule "once sufficient foundation
has been laid to show that the method of treatment--and hence the
standard of care--is common to both schools" (id.), but found
that the foundational requirement had not been met.4
Likewise, in plaintiff's case, there has been no
foundational showing of a common standard of care between Mustard
and defendants.

Moreover, the discrepancy between Mustard's

expertise and that of Vickie's health care providers is much
greater than the distinction in Burton.

Defendants and Mustard

do not perform the same activities with respect to individual
patients.

Mustard has no experience or certification in

therapeutic decisionmaking, the essence of the health care
providers' responsibilities.

He works on an institutional, not a

personal, level. While he is charged with protecting
institutions against unnecessary risk, defendants are charged
with maximizing Vickie's abilities and lifestyle choices.
Plaintiff's case is more nearly akin to Chadwick v. Nielsen.
Nielsen performed vascular surgery to relieve pain in Chadwick's
leg, but the pain persisted after the operation, leading to a
4

The Supreme Court of Utah recently reaffirmed the validity
of the Burton test in Boice v. Marble, 366 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18
(Utah 1999) .
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medical malpractice action some five years later.

This Court

held that because "the standard of care applicable to a vascular
surgeon in the removal of veins is not within the common
knowledge and experience of laypersons" (Chadwick, 763 P.2d at
822), it must be established by expert testimony.

The Court

rejected Chadwick1s attempt to fulfill this requirement with the
testimony of her father, an electrical engineer with expertise in
fluid mechanics, observing that "[t]o adopt Chadwick1s position,
although its creativity is acknowledged, would allow geologists
to give expert testimony as to the appropriate principles to be
employed in the extraction of gallstones. We think such a result
would not enhance justice in medical malpractice cases."

Id.

The trial court's decision to preclude Mustard's expert
testimony in this case does not exceed the limits of
reasonability and does not constitute reversible error.

As the

Court remarked in Dikeou,
In exercising [its] discretion, we believe a trial
court should require a medical expert witness to
demonstrate familiarity with the applicable standard of
care based on more than just a review of the documents
in the particular case. By definition, an expert is
one who possesses a significant depth and breadth of
knowledge on a given subject. To allow a doctor in one
specialty, retained as an expert witness, to become an
"expert" on the standard of care in a different medical
specialty by merely reading and studying the documents
in a given case invites confusion, error, and a trial
fraught with unreliable testimony.
Dikeou, 881 P.2d at 947. Mustard's proposed testimony was based
not on day-to-day, hands-on experience of the kind rendered by
defendants and their employees, but on remote assessment of
institutional, not individual, risks, employing criteria other
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than the balancing of a particular residentfs personal needs and
capabilities.

Because no foundational testimony established that

the methods of analysis he employed in determining institutional
risk were the same methods used by Vickie's health care providers
to select appropriate recreational opportunities for her, the
court was within its discretion to preclude Mustard's testimony
as to the standard of care applicable to them.

Plaintiff's

failure to identify record evidence showing a shared standard of
care leaves this Court without grounds for reversal, and the
trial court's decision must consequently be affirmed.
III. PLAINTIFF'S "SPECIAL DUTY" ARGUMENT MUST BE
REJECTED BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL.
For the first time on appeal, plaintiff argues that USDC
stood in a special relationship to Vickie, conferring an
affirmative duty on defendants to protect her from harm (see
Aplt. Brf. at 30-33).
the court below.

This theory was not raised or addressed in

It is this Court's established practice not to

consider such issues on review; in the Court's words, "It is well
settled that, absent extraordinary circumstances or plain error,
issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."

US

Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah
App. 1994); see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847
(Utah 1994) ("As a general rule, we will review issues raised for
the first time on appeal only if exceptional circumstances or
'plain error' exists").

Plaintiff has identified no exceptional
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circumstances or plain error that would justify the Court's
attention to her tardily raised theory.

CONCLUSION
Having brought her case under the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, plaintiff should not now be heard to assert that
no professional malpractice was involved.

Because the action

correctly sounds in medical malpractice as defined by statute,
plaintiff was required to establish the standard of care by
expert testimony.

The trial court's rejection of plaintiff's

proposed expert witness is supported by the evidence of record
and within the limits of reasonability.

For these reasons, the

directed verdict in favor of defendants is entitled to
affirmance, as more fully explained above.

Therefore, defendants

respectfully request this Court to affirm the decision of the
trial court.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendants believe the law is sufficiently established as to
the issues in this case that a decision can be rendered without
oral argument.

However, in the event that oral argument is

ordered by the Court, defendants wish to participate.

Defendants

do believe that the facts of the case would make a published
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opinion helpful as a guide for further litigation in the
sensitive areas of medical malpractice and patient rights.

M

Dated this cMM

day of April, 1999.

NANCY L. KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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